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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20020936-CA

vs.
SCOT KEN SCUDERI,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his conviction for possession of a clandestine laboratory within
500 feet of a residence, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d4(l)(a) and/or (b) (2000) and Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5(l)(d), (f), and/or (g), in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Robin W. Reese presiding. This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. Was trial counsel ineffective for refusing to file a motion to dismiss for
violation of the speedy trial statute where the delays in defendant's trial were all
supported by good cause?
This Court reviews claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time
on appeal de novo. See State v. Callahan, 866 P.2d 590, 593 (Utah App. 1993). However,
this Court reviews the trial court's determinations of good cause to continue the trial
pursuant to the speedy trial statute for abuse of discretion. See State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d
421,424-25 (Utah 1991). Inasmuch as the trial court never ruled on a motion to dismiss for

violation of the speedy trial statute, this Court reviews the ultimate question of whether good
cause supported delaying the trial beyond the 120-day period de novo. See id.
Issue 2. Did officers act in bad faith when they destroyed a clandestine
laboratory pursuant to department policy and after processing it for evidence?
A trial court's determination of whether police destroyed evidence in bad faith is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 324 (Utah App. 1998).
Issue 3. Was defendant harmed by counsel's failure to object to testimony that
defendant had served prison time where the jury already knew that he had once before
been caught in possession of a clandestine laboratory?
This Court reviews claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time
on appeal de novo. See Callahan, 866 P.2d at 593.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Defendant's appeal requires this Court to apply Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (2003),
attached as Addendum A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS1
In the early morning hours of January 29, 2000, Officer Scott Daniels of the South
Salt Lake Police discovered a clandestine laboratory in the garage of Felice Mahoney (R.

The Statement of the Case and Facts provides only a general recitation of the
procedural history and facts necessary to understand the posture of this case on appeal. More
detailed facts relevant to each issue are provided in the argument of that issue.
2

326:70-71; 153). Officer Daniels called out the DEA to remove the laboratory from the
garage and process it for evidence (R. 326:71).

The DEA found glassware,

methamphetamine precursors, chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine, and other
laboratory equipment used to manufacture methamphetamine (R. 327:281-83; State Ex. Nos.
1-11, 15-16, 18-20, 26-34). The processing of the lab yielded no fingerprints or other
evidence of who owned the lab (R. 326:112).
During the subsequent investigation, Felice informed Officer Daniels that the lab
belonged to defendant and that she had only let him store it in her garage (R. 326:69).
Officer Daniels tracked down defendant and interviewed him (R. 326:76). Defendant
admitted that he knew the lab was in Felice's garage, but claimed that the lab was not his
(326:77). He confessed, however, that two milk jugs filled with soaking pseudoephedrine
found in the garage were his (R. 326:77). He added that "it was important for him not to
have those at his house, and that he was storing them from the last time he had been caught"
(R. 326:77).
The State charged defendant with one count of possession of a clandestine laboratory
within 500 feet of a residence (R. 4-15). A jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 228-29;
328:338-39). The court sentenced defendant to the statutory prison term (R. 253-54).

Witnesses at trial referred to Felice as both Felice Mahoney and Felice Fontanez.
Felice testified the day after her wedding and stated that her name was Felice Yvette
Mahoney Winger (R. 327:183). The State will simply refer to her as "Felice" in its brief.
3

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme Court (R. 289-90). That court
poured the case over to this Court (R. 315).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I. Trial counsel was not ineffective for refusing to file a motion to dismiss
for violation of the speedy trial statute because the trial court would have denied the motion.
Each of the delays in the trial between February 9, 2001, and December 19, 2001, were
prompted by defendant's changes in counsel and the need for new counsel to have adequate
time to prepare for trial. The lone delay requested by the State was for good cause
established on the record.
POINT II. When the State destroys evidence that is only potentially exculpatory,
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the State acted in bad faith. The officers in
the instant case acted pursuant to department policy after taking samples from the laboratory
and examining them for fingerprints. Moreover, any decision not to examine a particular
item for fingerprints was not motivated by a bad faith intent to conceal exculpatory evidence,
but rather, was a subjective determination by the officer that the item did not contain any
transferable fingerprints.
POINT III. Defendant was not harmed by counsel's failure to object to testimony at
trial that defendant had served prison time. An error by counsel, even if professionally
unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the
error had no effect on the judgment. The jury already knew that defendant had been caught
once before in possession of a clandestine laboratory. It came as no surprise, therefore, that
4

he had served prison time. Additionally, defendant confessed to possessing a controlled
substance precursor, and there was substantial evidence that he intended to use the precursor
to manufacture methamphetamine. Hence, there is no reasonable likelihood of a different
outcome even if counsel had objected to the statements.
ARGUMENT
I. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR REFUSING TO
FILE A MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE THE STATE'S FAILURE
TO BRING DEFENDANT TO TRIAL WITHIN THE 120-DAY PERIOD
WAS SUPPORTED BY GOOD CAUSE
On November 7, 2000, defendant filed a demand for disposition of his case within
120 days (R. 20). Defendant was not brought to trial until March 20, 2002 (R. 326).
Defendant claims on appeal that his rights under the speedy trial statute were violated and
that his case should be dismissed. Aplt. Br. at 24. He acknowledges, however, that his claim
may not be preserved. Aplt. Br. at 1, 36. Defendant asserts in the alternative that his trial
counsel was ineffective for refusing to file a motion to dismiss. Aplt. Br. at 35-36.
Specifically, he claims no good cause existed to support the delay in bringing him to trial,
and the trial court would therefore have granted his motion had it been filed. Aplt. Br. at 2436.
A. Defendant's claim is unpreserved.
Defendant contends that he preserved this claim in the trial court by a single sentence
in an letter he filed pro se after his conviction: "I would like to submit the motion to dismiss
on the 120-day disp. right to speedy trial issue myself," (R. 289). Aplt. Br. at 1. The trial
court never addressed defendant's request, and defendant has not argued plain error.
5

Defendant's single sentence did not preserve his claim for review by this Court. "The
mere mention of an issue without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority
does not preserve that issue for appeal." See State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah App.
1993) (quotations omitted).

"[T]he issue must be sufficiently raised to a level of

consciousness before the trial court and must be supported by evidence or relevant legal
authority." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 45, f 13, 2004 WL 1293240 (internal quotations and
citations omitted). Given that all but one of the delays were at the request of defendant or his
counsel, defendant's single sentence did not alert the trial court to the arguments he now
makes on appeal. As defendant has not argued plain error, this Court may only review his
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, % 33 n.5,
64 P.3d 1218 (refusing to consider defendant's unpreserved claim that jury instructions were
incorrect where defendant raised plain error for first time in reply brief); State v. Villarreal,
857 P.2d 949, 953 (Utah App. 1993) (noting that defendants may raise claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel for first time on appeal if defendant has new counsel and record is
adequate).
B. Proceedings below.
At the time the State filed charges against defendant, he was incarcerated for a parole
violation stemming from prior convictions for possessing a controlled substance and
operating a clandestine laboratory (R. 18; 331:19). Within a few of weeks of the State filing
charges, defendant delivered a Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges to the

6

authorized agent at the Utah State Prison (R. 20). The agent certified that she received the
notice on November 7, 2000 (R. 20).
At a hearing on November 15, 2000, defendant appeared pro se in court and the
information was read (R. 346:2). Defendant told the court he was represented by Victor
Gordon (R. 346:2). The court set roll call for November 28,2000 (R. 346:2). On November
20,2000, Debra Kreeck Mendez from the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association ("LDA")
entered an appearance in defendant's case (R. 23). Both Mendez and Gordon appeared at
roll call on November 28th, but defendant was not transported from the prison (R. 347:2).
Gordon told the court that he had just been retained the previous night and knew nothing
about the case (R. 347:2). He asked for a new roll call date that was "a little ways [off]," so
he could investigate and review the discovery (R. 348:2). The court set roll call for
December 14,2000 (R. 347:3). With the court's leave, Mendez withdrew from representing
defendant (R. 347:2).
On December 14,2000, defendant appeared in court for roll call, but Gordon did not
(R. 348:2). Defendant indicated that he wanted to reschedule the roll call so his attorney
could be present (R. 348:2). The court informed defendant that the State was ready to
proceed and that it was his choice to reschedule the hearing (R. 347:2-3). Defendant agreed,
and the court reset roll call for January 4, 2001 (R. 348:3).
On January 4, 2001, William Bell appeared in place of Victor Gordon because
Gordon had recently had surgery (R. 349:2). Bell stated that he preferred a continuance so
that Gordon could be present for roll call, but that the State opposed a continuance unless

7

defendant would waive his 120-day request (R. 349:3). Defendant refused to waive his
request, so Bell asked for a preliminary hearing (R. 349:3). The court set the preliminary
hearing for January 11, 2001 (R. 349:7).
At the preliminary hearing, defendant was again represented by Bell (R. 324:2).3
After testimony and argument, the court bound defendant over for trial (R. 324:37). Bell
indicated that neither he nor Victor Gordon c ould take defendant's case (R. 324:37-38). The
court reappointed LDA to represent defendant and set a scheduling conference for January
22, 2001 (R. 324:38). At that conference, the court set trial starting February 14, 2001 (R.
43).
On February 9, 2001, defendant appeared in court with Debra Kreeck Mendez and
Otis Sterling from LDA (R. 351:1-3). Mendez stated that she had an unwaiveable conflict
relating to a former client and asked to withdraw (R. 351:2). Defendant did not object and
the court granted the motion (R. 351:2-3). The court appointed Sterling to represent
defendant (R. 351:3). Sterling stated that he had not yet looked at defendant's file and was
"pretty cold" on the case (R. 351:3). He asked for a continuance to review the file, make
requests for discovery, and file additional motions he might think appropriate (R. 351:3). He
also indicated that he had several upcoming trials (R. 351:3-4). The court asked defendant

3

The transcript of roll call indicates that "William Bell" appeared for defendant but
does not list any contact information for him (R. 349:1). The transcripl of the preliminary
hearing indicates that "Gary Bell" appeared for defendant (R. 324:2). The Utah State Bar
directory of attorneys does not list a William Bell. The State presumes that the same person
appeared at both hearings and that the clerk or reporter wrote down the wrong name.
8

for his opinion on a continuance (R. 351:4). Defendant stated that he was concerned that the
120 days had already passed (R. 351:4). Sterling indicated that one of the motions he might
file would be a motion to dismiss for failure to bring the case to trial within 120 days (R.
351:4). The court told defendant that it was his counsel's request for a continuance and that
the State would not be penalized (R. 351:5). The State concurred that it was ready to
proceed with trial on February 14th, but that it would not object to a continuance if defense
counsel required it to prepare for trial (R. 351:4-5). The court granted the motion to
continue (R. 351:5). It specifically noted that the State was ready to proceed to trial on
February 14th but that defense counsel required more time to prepare for trial (R. 351:5).
The court set atrial date, with Sterling's agreement, of May 8, 2001 (R. 351:5).
On April 23,2001, defendant appeared in court with Sterling for a pre-trial conference
(R. 353:3). Sterling moved to continue the trial date (R. 353:3). He stated that the case
would require more preparation than he had initially anticipated (R. 353:3). The State raised
the issue of defendant's request for 120-day disposition (R. 353:4). The court reminded
defendant of his request and told him that if he agreed to a continuance that the time would
not be counted against the State (R. 353:4). Defendant stated that he understood and had no
objection (R. 353:4). Sterling requested a trial date at the end of July (R. 353:5). The State
did not object except to note that it had a jury trial on July 30th and 31st (R. 353:5). The
court set a new trial date with the agreement of the parties for August 8, 2001 (R. 353:5).
On July 31,2001, Sterling appeared in court without defendant and requested another
short continuance (R. 354:7). He stated that he had spoken to defendant and that defendant
9

wanted him to be as prepared as possible and did not object to the continuance (R. 354:7).
The court continued the trial to August 30, 2001 (R. 354:11).
On August 16,2001, the court held a hearing to resolve several pending motions (R.
325:3). Defendant was present with Sterling (R. 325:3). During the hearing, the State raised
the issue of a possible conflict of interest for LDA to continue to represent defendant (R.
325:46). The State asserted that it recently learned from Felice Mahoney that Debra Kreeck
Mendez had previously represented Felice in another criminal drug matter (R. 325:46). The
State explained that after Mendez withdrew from the instant matter, she interviewed Felice
about defendant's case (R. 325:47). The State further explained that Sterling revealed on
August 6,2001, that he intended to call Mendez as a witness regarding her conversation with
Felice (R. 325:47). Sterling responded by claiming that Mendez spoke to Felice before she
withdrew and before she was aware that a conflict existed (R. 325:48-49). He alleged that
Mendez never represented Felice, but that Mendez discovered during her interview with
Felice that one of Mendez's current client's may have been involved in possessing or
operating the clandestine laboratory at issue in defendant's case (R. 325:49). At that point,
Sterling asserted, Mendez realized she had a conflict and withdrew from the case (R.
325:49).
The court determined that if what the State had proffered was true, then a conflict
would exist (R. 325:47-48, 57). The court asked Sterling to submit an affidavit from
Mendez before August 23, 2001, detailing any contact or prior representation of Felice (R.
325:58-59). It instructed the State to review the affidavit and decide whether it would like

10

an evidentiary hearing to resolve any discrepancies between Felice's assertions and
Mendez's affidavit (R. 325:59). Mendez submitted an affidavit that essentially corroborated
Sterling's claims at the hearing and added that LDA had represented Felice on prior matters,
but Mendez had not (R. 168-73).
On August 24, defendant filed a motion to continue the trial because one of his
witnesses would be unavailable the day of trial (R. 174-75). The State objected to the
motion (R. 331:2). The court held a hearing the same day to discuss the motion (R. 331:2).
Sterling was present but defendant was not (R. 331:2). Before addressing defendant's
motion, the court asked the State whether it would like a hearing on the issue of LDA's
possible conflict (R. 331:2). The State responded that it did not want a hearing, but that it
did want the court to exclude Mendez's testimony from trial based on her affidavit (R.
331:5). The State explained that LDA had represented Felice at least three times and that
Mendez currently represented another possible owner/operator of the clandestine laboratory
in question (R. 331:5). The State asserted that it would be improper for LDA to crossexamine Felice and for Mendez to testify about her conversation with Felice (R. 331:6-9).
The court determined that LDA possibly had a conflict and that LDA should consider
handing the case off to conflict counsel (R. 331:15). Sterling stated that he was ready to try
the case and that defendant trusted him, but he had no objection to handing the case off if
that was "the cleanest and best way" to resolve the possible conflicts (R. 331:15-16). The
State objected based on defendant's request for 120-day disposition (R. 331:17). The
prosecutor noted that this was a foreseeable conflict for defense counsel, observed that
11

defendant was in custody, and stated, "this delay cannot go on" (R. 331:17). The court
decided it would continue the trial and wait until defendant could be present on August 30th
to decide whether or not to appoint conflict counsel (R. 331:18). The State reiterated that it
was important "to be sensitive to [defendant's] custody status" (R. 331:19). The court
replied, "Well, I'm not—I'm not criticizing you for being sensitive, I appreciate that; but
that's what I'll do unless—unless, Counsel, you object strenuously" (R. 331:19). The State
responded, "I—you—you've made your ruling, your Honor" (R. 331:19). The State then
asked if the court would set a new trial date (R. 331:19). The court declined and stated that it
would prefer to involve defendant's new trial counsel in selecting a date (R. 331:19).
On August 30, 2001, defendant appeared in court with Sterling (R. 355:3). Sterling
represented that he had explained to defendant "what's taken place since the last time we
were here" and that defendant "fully understands" (R. 355:3). The court explained to
defendant that LDA had a conflict representing him because Mendez may be called as a
witness and LDA had previously represented the State's chief witness (R. 355:4). Conflict
counsel was not present at the hearing, so the court set a scheduling hearing for September
11,2001 (R. 355:4). On September 4,2001., Sterling filed a motion to withdraw because of
the conflict (R. 193-94). The court granted the motion the next day and appointed Susanne
Gustin and Sharon Preston to represent defendant (R. 195).
On September 6, 2001, Preston filed a motion to continue the scheduling hearing
because of "a previous commitment in another court" (R. 199). She indicated that the State
consented to the continuance (R. 199).

12

On October 4, 2001, defendant appeared in court with Preston for the scheduling
hearing (R. 363:3). The court stated that it had given defense counsel "the two separate dates
we have left this year" for trial (R. 363:3). Preston stated that she had a conflict with the
November date, but not the December date (R. 363:3). The court set trial for December 19,
2001 (363:3).
On December 17, 2001, the State filed a motion to continue (R. 210-14). The State
asserted that a necessary witness had skin cancer surgery on December 14,2001 and "should
not be out and amongst people to avoid the possibility of infection" (R. 210). The State
further explained that the witness was only a chain-of-custody-witness and that, if defendant
would stipulate to the chain of custody, the trial could proceed as scheduled (R. 211). That
same day, the court held a pre-trial conference with defendant present (R. 356:3). Preston
indicated that defendant refused to stipulate to the chain of custody, and that he opposed a
continuance (R. 356:5). The court granted the State's motion based on the witness's health
concerns and the numerous continuances defendant had previously received (R. 356:5). The
court noted that the earliest possible trial date would be in late February or early March
sometime after the 2002 Winter Olympics (R. 356:5). The parties agreed on the first
available date for a three-day trial: March 20, 2001 (R. 356:6).
On March 20, 2001, defendant's trial was held as scheduled, and the jury convicted
him as charged (R. 326-28). During the subsequent sentencing proceedings, trial counsel
told the court that defendant had asked her to file a motion to dismiss for violation of the
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speedy trial statute (R. 332:3). Counsel stated, "I had reviewed things and felt that there was
no basis for that.. ." (R. 332:3).
C. Good cause supported trying defendant more than 120 days after his
request for speedy disposition.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (2003) permits an incarcerated defendant to request the
speedy disposition of pending charges. When a defendant makes such a request, the State
must bring the defendant to trial within 120 days of delivery of his request to the prison
warden, or the case is dismissed with prejudice. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1).
The 120-day period is not, however, inflexible. "[T]he prosecuting attorney or the
defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in open court, with the prisoner or his
counsel being present, may be granted any reasonable continuance." Utah Code Ann. § 7729-1(3). Additionally, the court may only order dismissal of the case u[i]f the court finds
that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the time required
is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for continuance was made or
not." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4). In either case, "it is the finding of good cause that is
dispositive and not actual the granting of a continuance." State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421,
426 (Utah 1991). This Court reviews the trial court's findings of good cause for abuse of
discretion. See id. at 424-25.
In the instant case, defendant never moved to dismiss the case, so the trial court never
made a good cause determination pursuant to a motion to dismiss under Utah Code Ann. §
77-29-1 (4). Instead, defendant claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion
to dismiss. Aplt. Br. at 35-36. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires that
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defendant demonstrate both deficient performance and prejudice.

See Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah App.
1998). To prove prejudice, defendant must show that if trial counsel had filed a motion to
dismiss, the trial court would have granted it. See Gallegos, 967 P.2d at 976 ("[FJailure of
counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if raised does not constitute
ineffective assistance"). This Court must therefore place itself in the position of the trial
court and determine de novo whether the delay of defendant's trial beyond the 120-day
period was supported by good cause. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4). In making that
determination, this Court reviews the trial court's grant of continuances under Utah Code
Ann. § 77-29-1(3) for abuse of discretion. See Petersen, 810 P.2d at 424-25. If the trial
court abuses its discretion in granting a continuance, this Court may nevertheless excuse the
delay if good cause is apparent in the record. See id. at 425-26 (holding that trial court
abused its discretion by granting a continuance without a request from the parties, but
nevertheless performing good cause analysis because "it is the finding of good cause that is
dispositive and not the actual granting of a continuance").4

In focusing on the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
State is not conceding that defense counsel was deficient for choosing not to file a motion to
dismiss. Defendant is entitled to "reasonably effective assistance," not perfect advocacy. Id.
at 687. Additionally, this Court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel "rendered
adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. In fact, "strategic choices made after
thorough investigation of the law and the facts relevant to plausible options are virtually
unchallengeable." Id. In the instant case, defendant's trial counsel, Sharon Preston, stated
on the record that she had reviewed the proceedings and could find no basis for filing a
15

To determine whether the trial court would have granted a motion to dismiss for
violation of the speedy trial statute, this Court performs a two-step inquiry. See State v.
Hankerson, 2003 UT App 433, ^ 10, 82 P.3d 1155, cert, granted, 20040099-SC (Utah April
27, 2004) (order granting petition for certiorari). First it must determine when the 120-day
period began and when it expired. Id. Second, if the trial was held outside the 120-day
period, this Court must determine whether good cause excused the delay. Id.
Good cause has been established in prior cases under a variety of circumstances that
fall into two general categories: (1) delay caused by the defendant—such as asking for a
continuance—and (2) "a relatively short delay caused by unforeseen problems arising
immediately prior to trial." Petersen, 810 P.2d at 426; see also, State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d
911,916 (Utah 1998) (finding good cause where defendant waives preliminary hearing and
then changes mind just days before trial causing delay of trial); State v. Bullock, 699 P.2d
753, 756 (Utah 1985) (holding that illness of defense counsel is good cause even though
defendant requested to have counsel dismissed and to proceed pro se); Hankerson, 2003 UT
App 433, \ 13 (holding that delay caused by defendant's motion to dismiss for violation of
the speedy trial statute is good cause); State v. Houston, 2003 UT App 416, \ 13,82 P.3d 219
(finding good cause where defense counsel's unavailability caused, in part, delay of trial
outside 120-day period); State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281,1(8,34 P.3d 790 (holding that

motion to dismiss for violation of the speedy trial statute (R. 332:3). Defense counsel's
informed decision was not deficient, even if later determined incorrect. This is especially
true where defendant's previous counsel, Otis Sterling, also stated that he might file a motion
to dismiss, but ultimately never filed the motion (R. 351:4).
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defendant's motion to suppress evidence was good cause that tolled running of 120-day
period). But see Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915-16 (holding that delay in trial caused by court
clerk's error was not good cause where State made no effort to move trial along);
Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146, Tf 15 (holding no good cause where trial court sua sponte
rescheduled trial to accommodate higher priority case but made no good cause findings);
Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ^f 13 (holding that State waived argument that defendant's
request for delayed preliminary hearing tolled 120-day period where State "passively
accepted" the request).
In the instant case, defendant correctly asserts that the 120-day period began on
November 7, 2000, and, if uninterrupted, expired on March 6, 2001. Aplt. Br. at 26.
Defendant's trial was held on March 20,2002, well outside the 120-day period (R. 326-27).
However, a review of the record demonstrates that the entire delay in bringing defendant to
trial was supported by good cause. Defendant caused delay within the original 120 dayperiod, and every continuance of the trial date beyond the initial 120-day period, except one,
was caused by defendant, tolling the 120-day period in each instance (R. 193-94, 210-13;
347:2; 348:3; 351:3-5; 353:4; 354:7; 355:4; 363:3; 356:7). The single exception was a
continuance obtained by the State for good cause because a chain-of-custody witness was
having surgery and could not attend the trial (R. 210-13; 356:5).
1.

The court properly found good cause on the record for the
continuance on February 9,2001.

Defendant agrees that the 120-day period was tolled by (1) his request for a
continuance of roll call from November 28,2000, to December 14,2000, and (2) the failure
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of his counsel to appear on December 14,2000, until the next roll call hearing on January 4,
2001. Aplt. Br. at 29-30. Defendant correctly concludes that these good cause delays
extended the expiration of the 120-day period thirty-seven days to April 12,2001. Aplt. Br.
at 30
Defendant's contends, however, that the first continuance requested by his newly
appointed counsel, Otis Sterling, on February 9, 2001, did not toll the 120-day period
because the court did not determine "on the record 'in open court' whether [defendant] was
willing to waive the 120-day disposition period for a good cause continuance." Aplt. Br. at
31.
Defendant's waiver is not necessary for the court to find good cause. The speedy trial
statute permits the trial court to find good cause based on a request for continuance by
defense counsel. "After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in open court,
with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any reasonable continuance."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3) (emphasis added). In fact, both this Court and the Utah
Supreme Court have held that a request by defense counsel for a continuance to
accommodate his schedule constitutes a good cause delay that does not count against the
State. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917; Houston, 2003 UT App 416,113; Coleman, 2001 UT
App 281, Tf 18. Here, defense counsel had good cause to request a continuance. He had just
been appointed, had not yet even read defendant's file, was completely unprepared to go to
trial in five days, and already had several trials scheduled (R. 351:3-4). Additionally, the
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trial court found on the record in open court that the delay was for good cause (R. 351:5).
The court noted that the State was prepared to go forward and that the delay was caused only
by defendant's substitution of counsel and the need for new counsel to have adequate time to
prepare for trial (R. 351:5). The court thus acted within its discretion in granting the
continuance and finding that the delay should not be counted against the State (R. 351:5).
See Coleman^ 2001 UT App 281,118.
2.

The court properly found good cause on the record for a
continuance on August 30, 2001.

Defendant agrees that the continuances of the trial from May 8, 2001 to August 7,
2001 and from August 7, 2001, to August 30, 2001 were at his request and should not be
counted against the State. Aplt. Br. at 31. He contends, however, that the continuance of the
trial on August 30, 2001, for his own substitution of counsel should be attributable to the
State because "the State waited from October 18, 2000, when [defendant] was originally
charged, until August 16,2001, just 14 days before the trial was scheduled to begin, to bring
up the conflict issue." Aplt. Br. at 32. Additionally, defendant claims that the trial court
"failed to show in open court that a conflict really existed." Aplt. Br. at 33.
Defendant's claims are unsupported by the record. The continuance of the trial
beyond August 30th was the result of a decision by defense counsel and the court that a
potential conflict existed necessitating defense counsel's withdrawal. The continuance
therefore fits under the first of the two good cause exceptions: "delay caused by the
defendant—such as asking for a continuance." Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146, | 10.
Although the State first raised the possibility of a conflict, the State later told the court that
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LDA did not need to be disqualified (R. 331:5). Instead, the State attempted to keep the case
moving by asking the court to exclude Mendez's testimony or, in the alternative, to order
LDA to disclose Mendez's notes to the State (R. 331:2, 5). The court then sua sponte
suggested that LDA withdraw (R. 331:15),. Otis Sterling replied, "Judge, you know, I
certainly don't have an objection if this Court feels like, hey, to clear this up any of these
possible conflict issues, the cleanest and best way to do so is to hand it off to conflict
counsel, I'm certainly not going to object to that" (R. 331:15-16). The State objected to the
substitution of counsel based on defendant's 120-day disposition request and his right to a
speedy trial (R. 331:17-19). In response to the State's objection, the court stated:
Well, I think what I'll do is this: There are problems that I can see. I
don't—I don't think there's anything necessarily wrong with an attorney
calling as a witness for his client one of the other attorneys in his firm and the
State also calling another attorney from the firm as its witness. That happens
from time to time, but it is—it is irregular and should be done only in—I think
it should be done only with the greatest of care.
But when that is coupled with the fact that—that the defense has rela—has
represented, rather, the State's chief witness on at least two or three other
occasions, you indicate, Ms. Coebergh, that that also presents the possibility of
conflict.
So, I'll continue the t r i a l . . . .
(R. 331:18). The court then said:
I don't know that there's much prejudice to Mr. Scuderi. You—you say that
it's been scheduled a number of times for trial. You're absolutely right, but a
lot of those delays have been due to Mr. Scuderi's own problems, I guess
you'd say, and I don't know that there's any prejudice that comes to him
because he is in prison and he hasn't objected to any of those postponements
at this point, anyway.
(R. 331:19). A few days later, Sterling filed a motion to withdraw and appoint conflict
counsel (R. 193-94).
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Contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court did find good cause on the record to
continue the trial. The court described the conflict, addressed the 120-day disposition issue,
and declared that the conflict necessitated continuing the trial to appoint conflict counsel (R.
331:17-19). Defendant cannot now complain that the State caused the delay merely because
it brought to the court's attention the facts which led the court and defense counsel to
conclude a conflict existed. The State never filed a motion to disqualify defense counsel, but
rather, objected when the court suggested defense counsel withdraw (R. 331:17-19).
Defense counsel then filed his own motion to withdraw and appoint conflict counsel (R.
193-94). Thus, contrary to defendant's claim, the delay was caused by defense counsel's
decision to withdraw, not the State. Moreover, the court determined, on the record, in open
court, and over the State's objection, that the potential conflict necessitated a continuance to
appoint conflict counsel.
In any event, this Court should determine that the delay was supported by good cause
because it is apparent from the record that LDA's conflict required it to withdraw. An
attorney need not have an actual conflict of interest to be disqualified or to withdraw from
representing a party. "A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third
person or by the lawyer's own interest . . . ." Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(b) (emphasis
added). The words "may be" in rule 1.7 indicate that a lawyer should not represent a party if
the potential for conflict exists.
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In the instant case, a potential conflict existed because the State's chief witness,
Felice, was a former client of LDA (R. 331:5, 14). See Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory
Opinion Committee Opinion No. 02-06 (June 2002) ('The examination of a former client as
an adverse witness on behalf of another client presents a potential conflict of interest for the
attorney . . . . " ) . Additionally, defendant wanted to use Mendez, an LDA attorney, to rebut
Felice's testimony (R. 325:50-51). See Utah R. Prof. Conduci 3.7 (stating that a lawyer may
act as an advocate at trial where another lawyer in the firm may testify only so long as rule
1.7 and 1.9 are not violated). Mendez had already withdrawn from representing defendant
because of an unwaivable conflict relating to a former client that she discovered while
interviewing Felice (R. 170-72). Speeificetlly, Felice told Mendez thatt one of Mendez's
current clients was involved with the clandestine laboratory at issue in defendant's case (R.
172; 325:49). Thus, Mendez's rebuttal testimony against Felice might have risked violating
her duty of loyalty to her other client. See State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430, 435-36 (Utah
1996) ("At the very least, this duty of loyalty requires attorneys to refrain from acting as an
advocate against their clients, even in a matter unrelated to the case for which the attorney
has been retained.")
Sterling could not know until Felice testified whether he would need to call Mendez
to testify and the extent to which he would have to cross-examine Felice. Thus, the court
and defense counsel properly determined that the confluence of conflict and irregularity
presented by LDA's prior representation of Felice, and the chance that defendant may need
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to call a previously conflicted-out LDA attorney to testify against Felice, justified removing
LDA as counsel and appointing conflict counsel (R. 331:15-16, 18).
Defendant's complaint that no good cause existed because "the State waited until the
last minute to bring up the issue" is also meritless. Aplt. Br. at 33. The State had no reason
to believe that LDA had a conflict until Sterling disclosed that he might call Mendez as a
rebuttal witness against Felice. When Mendez withdrew from representing defendant in
February 2001, she stated only that she had an "unwaiveable conflict that relates to a former
client" (R. 351:2). LDA did not completely withdraw from representing defendant, but
appointed Otis Sterling to represent him (R. 351:3). Nothing in Mendez's brief explanation
of her conflict alerted the State that Mendez's conflict should be imputed to LDA and that
LDA should not represent defendant. The State did not learn that LDA had previously
represented its chief witness, Felice, until, on August 6, 2001, Sterling disclosed to the
prosecutor the conversation between Mendez and Felice and indicated that he might call
Mendez to testify against Felice (R. 325:47; 331:17). The State immediately raised the issue
at a subsequent motion hearing (R. 325:46-47). Thus, the State did not "wait[ ] until the last
minute" to raise the issue of a conflict, but acted promptly when it learned of the conflict.
Aplt. Br. at 33.

Moreover, the State actively, but unsuccessfully, sought the only

alternative that would prevent the conflict from becoming a problem while keeping the case
moving ahead to a timely trial. Hence, the State satisfied its duty under the statute to bring
the case to trial.
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3.

Good cause existed to support holding the trial on December 19,
2001, because the delay was, in part, to accommodate defense
counsel's schedule.

On October 4, 2001, defendant's new counsel, Sharon Preston, appeared with
defendant in court, and the court set trial for December 19, 2001 (R. 363:3). Defendant
claims that the December trial date violated his request for 120-day disposition because the
court failed to explain why no earlier date was available. Aplt. Br. at 33. He claims the
State should have objected and asked the court to explain on the record why it could not set
an earlier trial date. Aplt. Br. at 33. Defendant's claim is merit less because the late trial date
was set, in part, to accommodate defense counsel's schedule.
When a trial is not set for the earliest possible date to accommodate, even in part,
defense counsel's schedule, the resultant delay is not attributable to the State. See Houston,
2003 UT App 416, ^ 13; Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ^ 18; Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917. The
instant case is analogous to State v. Houston. Houston had a trial set for March 13th. See
Houston, 2003 UT App 416, f 12. The State filed a "Notice of Expert Witnesses" on
February 27th, and the court determined that it would have lo reschedule the trial to give
Houston the full thirty-day notice for the expert witnesses as required by statute. Id. In
rescheduling the trial, Houston's counsel stated that he was unavailable the week of April
1st, and the court noted that it was unavailable the weeks of April 8th and 15th. Id. at ^f 5.
The court noted those facts on the record and set trial for April 24th. Id. at Tf 12. Houston
later filed a motion to dismiss for violation of the speedy trial statute, which the trial court
denied. Id. at f 6. This Court affirmed the trial court and held that the statements of the trial
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court and Houston's counsel during the rescheduling established good cause to hold trial
beyond the 120-day period.
Like Houston, the December trial date in this case was chosen to accommodate, in
part, the schedule of defense counsel. The trial court stated on the record that there were
only two possible dates it could hold a trial before the end of the year, and defense counsel
stated that she had a conflict with the first date (R. 363:3). At the start of the hearing, the
court told Preston, "I know, counsel, you were given the two separate dates we have left this
year" (R. 363:3) (emphasis added). Preston replied that she had a conflict with the
November date, but not the December date (R. 363:3). The court then set trial for the
December date (R. 363:3). "[Ejxtending the trial date to a reasonable time outside the
disposition period to accommodate, in part, defense counsel's schedule constitutes good
cause." Beaton, 958 P.2d at 917 (quotations omitted).
Defendant's relies on State v. Wagenman for his claim that the State should have
demanded that the trial court make a finding on the record as to why no earlier trial date was
available. Aplt. Br. at 33. Wagenman is distinguishable from the both this case and Houston
and does not stand for the proposition which defendant asserts. In Wagenman, the trial court
sua sponte rescheduled Wagenman's case to accommodate a higher priority case. 2003 UT
App 146, f 4. The court made no factual findings concerning the rescheduling and its
evaluation of priorities, and the State did not ask the court to make a good cause finding. Id.
at \ 4. The court later denied Wagenman's motion to dismiss for violation of the speedy trial
statute. Id. at f 5. Following State v. Coleman, this Court held that the "State had an
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affirmative duty to request that the trial court make its determination of good cause in open
court and to ask the court to create a record in support of its good cause determination." Id.
at^f 15.
Wagenman does not support defendant's claim that the State should have asked the
trial court to explain on the record why December 19, 2001, was the earli est possible date to
hold defendant's trial. Wagenman concerned the trial court's failure to make findings of
good cause to reschedule the trial. This court never decided in Wagenman whether the
length of the delay was reasonable or whether the trial court had rescheduled the trial to the
earliest possible date because it held that trial court never established good cause for any
delay at all. Here the court established good cause when it determined on the record that a
conflict of interest necessitated defense counsel's withdrawal (R. 331:18). It also established
good cause to delay the trial until December 19,2001, because of, in part, defense counsel's
unavailability. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917.
4.

The length of the continuance from December 19, 2001 to
March 20, 2002 was reasonable.

Defendant concedes on appeal that good cause existed to continue the December 19th
trial date, because a state witness had just completed skin cancer surgery and could not leave
his home until the end of January (R. 210-13). Aplt. Br. at 34. He contends, however, that
the State "failed its affirmative obligation to ensure that good cause for such a prolonged
continuance be shown in open court." Aplt. Br. at 34 (quotations omitted).
Defendant's argument that the State must show good cause for the length of the delay
misconstrues the speedy trial statute. The statute permits the court to grant "any reasonable
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continuance" if it finds good cause. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3). The good cause*
standard relates only to determining whether the reason for delaying the trial is sufficient.
The length of the delay, however, is governed by a reasonableness standard. See id. ("[T]he
prosecuting attorney . . . for good cause shown in open court, . . . may be granted any
reasonable continuance." (emphasis added)); Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917 (noting that setting
trial one month outside 120-day period to accommodate defense counsel's schedule was not
unreasonable); Houston, 2003 UT App 416, f 12 n.3 (noting that Houston had not argued
that length of continuance was unreasonable). Here, defendant concedes that the reason for
delaying the trial met the good cause standard. Aplt. Br. at 34. Thus, what he is really
arguing is that the length of the delay was unreasonable.
The delay of the trial from December 19, 2001 to March 20, 2002 was reasonable
because it was the earliest date available. The State explained that its witness's health would
not permit him to attend a trial until the second week of January (R. 210-13; 356:5). The
court replied, "And we can't go then, practically speaking. The earliest we could practically
go would be sometime after the Olympics, late February early March" (R. 356:5). Defense
counsel stated that defendant desired to assert his speedy trial rights (R. 356:5). The trial
court replied
I'll grant the State's Motion to Continue the trial given the circumstances; the
health concern and the fact that it's been continued a number of times before
at the defendant's request. I can try it on February the 6th and 7th . . . It can't
go into the 8th, however
(R. 356:5). The State then explained that the trial would take at least two and half or three
days (R. 356:6). The Court responded, "Okay. Well, then that's out. The next one would be
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Wednesday, March the 20th, Thursday the 21st, and then Friday the 22nd" (R. 356:6). The
parties agreed on those dates (R. 356:6).
Thus, the trial court explained on the record why the trial could not be held earlier
than March 20th. First, the earliest available date after the second week of January was only
a two-day trial date, and defendant's trial would require three days (R. 356:5-6). Second,
the court could not hold trial during the 2002 Winter Olympics, so the earliest possible trial
date was March 20, 2002 (R. 356:5).
Defendant complains, "[T]he further delay because of the Olympics cannot be
considered an 'unforeseen problem' that the trial court was not aware of," and claims that
delaying the trial until March was "unreasonable." Aplt. Br. at 35 (quoting Coleman, 2001
UT App 281 Tf 6). While it is true that the trial court had known for months or even years
that the Olympics would occur in February 2002, it could not know that the Olympics would
interfere with defendant's trial until it determined that it would have to continue the
December 19th trial date.
In any event, it was reasonable for the court not to schedule a criminal trial during the
Olympics. The Olympics were a unique and extraordinary event that consumed much of
Utah's time and resources. In April of 2001, the Administrative Office of the Courts sent a
memorandum to "All Justices, Judges, and Commissioners" explaining the impact of the
Olympics upon Utah's judiciary. See Administrative Office Of the Courts Memorandum,
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April 17,2001 (Memorandum), attached as Addendum B.5 The Memorandum detailed the
creation of "Olympic Courts" and explained that they would operate simultaneously with
regular courts and would utilize "existing staff and judges." Memorandum at 3. The
Memorandum also confirmed "the discretion vested in trial courts to schedule matters
pending before those courts with encouragement to avoid jury and criminal trials during the
Olympics to the degree possible." Id, at 4.
The contents of the Memorandum were certainly at the forefront of the trial court's
decision not to schedule the trial during the Olympics and justified delaying the trial until
March. The operation of Olympic Courts was going to put additional strain on the resources
of the district courts. The Olympics would also making empanelling a jury difficult.
Twenty-two thousand Utah citizens served as volunteers for the Olympics. See Salt Lake

5

The State asks this Court to take judicial notice of the memorandum under rule 201,
Utah Rules of Evidence. This Court has discretion to take judicial notice of facts which are
"capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned." Utah R. Evid. 201(b)(2); see also Mel Trimble Real Estate v.
Monte VistaRanchJnc,75&?2d45l,456(UtahApp.
1988). This Court will not normally
exercise its discretion in favor of taking judicial notice if such notice is used to circumvent
the rule against raising an issue for the first time on appeal. See Mel Trimble Real Estate,
758P.2dat456.
The instant case presents an ideal opportunity for this Court to take judicial notice.
The judicially noticed facts concern the advice of the Judicial Council and are found in a
memorandum sent to all Utah courts, including this one. See Memorandum at 1, 4. Thus,
this Court may readily authenticate the veracity and source of the facts. The facts also
concern an issue raised by the trial court below, but not explained in detail (R. 356:5). To
the extent the issue is raised for the first time on appeal, it is only in response to an issue
defendant raises for the first time on appeal: his own counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to
move to dismiss the case for violation of the speedy trial statute. If the trial court had
properly considered such a motion, as this Court must now do, it certainly would have
considered the facts in the Memorandum.
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City 2002 Winter Olympic Games Recap at http://www.olympic.org/uk/games/past/
index_uk.asp?OLGT=2&OLGY=2002 (last visited June 11, 2004). Many more were
holders of the 1.6 million tickets sold for the games and were planning on attending Olympic
events. See Memorandum at 1. Additionally, the Olympics were expected to make
downtown Salt Lake City very difficult to access. 6
Hence, good cause supported the delay of defendant's trial, and the length of the delay
was reasonable. Defendant's claim therefore fails.
II. OFFICERS DID NOT ACT IN BAD FAITH WHEN THEY
DESTROYED THE METHAMPHETAMINE LABORATORY
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to
suppress the evidence taken from Felice's garage. Aplt. Br. at 37. The evidence defendant
sought to suppress was sampled, examined by police, and then destroyed pursuant to the
standard policies and procedures of the E>rug Enforcement Agency (R. 326:130, 160).
Defendant asserts that the destroyed items may have contained exculpatory evidence and that
police acted in bad faith when they destroyed the evidence. Aplt. Br. at 37. Specifically,

6

The Memorandum also states, "The council also noted that some hearings and their
time frames are mandated by law and those hearings will need to be held as required."
Memorandum at 4. The juxtaposition of this statement with encouragement not to hold
criminal or jury trials during the Olympics indicates that it was not meant to apply to 120day disposition issues, which trial courts may extend for good cause. Rather, it applies to
non-trial hearings which the courts may not continue for good cause such as proceedings
before a magistrate following a warrantless arrest under rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and sentencing proceedings under rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
where the defendant refuse to waive his right to speedy sentencing.
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defendant claims that fingerprint evidence may have demonstrated that others had handled
the items while defendant had not. Aplt. Br. at 37.
A. Proceedings below.
When South Salt Lake police and the DEA discovered the clandestine laboratory in
Felice's garage, their first action was to carefully remove the laboratory to a well-ventilated
area and process it for evidence (R. 326:71-72; 115-16; 156-58). The processing included
labeling and photographing each item, taking samples of liquid and residue, and
fingerprinting (R. 326:115-16; 154). After the laboratory was processed for evidence, it was
turned over to ONYX, a hazardous waste disposal company, for destruction (R. 326:130).
Destruction of the laboratory is standard procedure "[bjecause of the hazardous nature of a
meth lab and the components of a meth lab" (R. 326:160).
After the State charged defendant with possession of the laboratory, he filed a motion
to dismiss the case or suppress evidence for failure to preserve potentially exculpatory
evidence (R. 114-18). In his motion, defendant asserted that of the nineteen items
containing liquid or residue that police removed from the garage, police only took samples of
eight (R. 115). He also asserted that it appeared that only one item was submitted to the
crime lab for fingerprinting (R. 115). He then claimed that the police's selective sampling of
the evidence and subsequent destruction demonstrated bad faith on the part of police (R.
115-18). Defendant submitted four exhibits in support of his motion (R. 114-18).
In its reply, the State did not dispute that police had only sampled some of the liquids
and residues (R. 149). It asserted, however, that police attempted to fingerprint the

31

laboratory items, but that only two prints of acceptable quality were discovered and those
lacked sufficient ridge detail for comparison (R. 149, 151), The State argued that the
unsampled items could not exonerate defendant, because they could not negate proof that the
sampled items were methamphetamine and pseudoephedrine (R. 153). It also argued that no
evidence of bad faith existed because the police "did their best to preserve the evidence from
the scene" and destroyed the evidence only to safeguard the public and to comply with
guidelines from the DEA and Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) (R.
150).
The trial court held a hearing at which it heard argument from both sides (R. 325:2745). It ultimately issued a written order denying defendant's motion (R. 187-88). The court
concluded that "[defendant failed to meet his burden of proof that the Officers knew when
they destroyed the clandestine laboratory equipment that it had exculpatory value" (R. 188).
It also concluded that "[defendant failed to demonstrate the Officers acted in bad faith in
destroying the evidence" (R. 188).
B. This Court reviews the trial court's determination that officers did not
act in bad faith for abuse of discretion.
This Court has held that a trial court's determination of whether police destroyed
evidence in bad faith is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318,
324 (Utah App. 1998). This is because, while "the determination of whether specific police
conduct rises to the level of bad faith is a question of law," it "turns on 'the quintessential
factual question of intent."5 Id. (quoting United State v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 909 (10th Cir.
1994)).
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Defendant asserts this Court should review the trial court's determination de novo
because the trial court made no factual findings. Aplt. Br. at 40. Defendant's assertion is
meritless. He provides little explanation and cites no cases holding that a court's failure to
make factual findings on the record changes the standard of review. Aplt. Br. at 40. In fact,
the Supreme Court has held just the opposite. "[I]n cases in which factual issues are
presented to and must be resolved by the trial court but no findings of fact appear in the
record, we 'assume that the trier of facts found them in accord with its decision

'" State

v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,787 (Utah 1991) (quoting Mower v. McCarthy, 245 P.2d 224,226
(Utah 1952)); see also State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, \ 11, 40 P.3d 626; State v. Robertson,
932 P.2d 1219, 1224-25 (Utah 1997), overruling on other grounds recognized by State v.
Reyes, 84 P.3d 841, 845 (Utah App. 2004).
Moreover, measuring lower court's exercise of its discretion does not require
examination of the court's specific factual findings. For example, a court abuses its
discretion if (1) the decision is beyond the limits of reasonableness, State v. Galli, 967 P.2d
930,939 (Utah 1998); (2) the decision is inherently unfair, State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649,
651 (Utah App. 1997), or (3) if no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the
lower court, Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651. In all three cases, the reviewing court may assume
the lower court resolved factual disputes in favor of its decision and then determine, in light
of the evidence and the law, whether the court's decision is unreasonable or inherently
unfair.

33

Accordingly, this Court should assume the trial court resolved any factual
discrepancies in favor of its decision and review that court's ultimate determination for abuse
of discretion. See Holden, 964 P.2d at 324.
C. The trial court properly determined that the officers did not act in bad
faith when they destroyed the clandestine laboratory.
Law enforcement officials have no "undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to
preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular
prosecution." Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988); Holden, 964 P.2d at 323.
Officials are only obligated to preserve evidence if its exculpatory value is apparent before
the evidence is destroyed, and the defendant could not obtain comparable evidence by other
reasonable means. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984). Otherwise, in
cases where the state fails '"to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said
than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the
defendant,' . . . a defendant must show 'bad faith on the part of the police.'" Holden, 964
P.2d at 323 (quoting Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57-58).
In the instant case, defendant concedes that police only destroyed evidence "that could
have been subjected to fingerprinting tests" that might have exonerated him. Aplt. Br. at 40.
He therefore brings his claim under the bad faith standard articulated in Youngblood. Aplt.
Br. at 37-42.
"Bad faith requires that a defendant prove more than mere negligence; a defendant
must show that 'the police . . . by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis
for exonerating defendant.'" Holden, 964 P.2d at 323 (alteration in original) (quoting
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Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58). "The presence or absence of bad faith by the police for
purposes of the Due Process Clause must necessarily turn on the police's knowledge of the
exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed." Youngblood, 488
U.S. at56,n*.
Defendant asserts that the officers who processed the laboratory for evidence acted in
bad faith because they only tested one or two items for fingerprints before turning the
laboratory over to ONYX for destruction. Aplt. Br. at 41. He asserts the police should have
known that the absence of his fingerprints on any laboratory equipment and the presence of
the fingerprints of others "could form a basis for exonerating him." Aplt. Br. at 41
As a threshold matter, defendant has failed to provide an adequate record with which
to review his claim. "Parties claiming error below and seeking appellate review have the
duty and responsibility to support their allegations with an adequate record" State v. Wetzel,
868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993); State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998).
"'When crucial matters are not included in the record, the missing portions are presumed to
support the action of the trial court.'" State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, If 13, 69 P.3d 1278
(quoting State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1988)). "Consequently, in the face of
'an [inadequate record on appeal, [this Court] must assume the regularity of the proceedings
below.'"Penman, 964 P.2d at 1162 (quoting State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403,405 (Utah 1986)
(per curiam)) (first alteration in original); see also Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 67; State v. Blubaugh,
904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App. 1995).
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Defendant has failed to provide an adequate record on appeal because the record does
not contain the exhibits defendant filed with his motion to dismiss. The question of whether
officers examined the laboratory components for fingerprints was disputed in the trial court,
and the exhibits supported defendant's assertion that officers only examined one or two
laboratory components for fingerprints (R. 114-18). Defendant claimed that officers only
tested one item for fingerprints and supported his assertion with "Attachment B" and
"Attachment D"(R. 115, 117; 325:32). The State responded that officers tried to obtain
fingerprints from the laboratory, but were not able to lift any useable prints (R. 149). The
State explained at the hearing on defendant's motion that officers examined some of the
laboratory components for fingerprints, but not all (R. 325:41). The trial court ultimately
determined that officers did not destroy the laboratory in bad faith, but made no factual
findings.
This Court must assume that the trial court resolved any factual disputes in
accordance with its decision. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 787. This Court must therefore
proceed on the basis that the trial court determined that officers sufficiently examined the
laboratory components for prints so as to negate any inference of bad faith. Defendant
reasserts on appeal that the officers examined only one or two laboratory items, but the
exhibits he attached to his motion in the trial court, "Attachment B" and " Attachment D," are
not in the record on appeal (R. 117). This Court cannot evaluate the trial court's factual
determination without the exhibits defendant proffered to the trial court in support of his
version of the facts. See Penman, 964 P.2d at 1162. Thus, this Court should assume the
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evidence supports the trial court's determination and affirm its ruling that officers did not act
in bad faith.
Even if this Court finds that the trial court clearly erred in determining that officers
sufficiently examined the laboratory for fingerprints, defendant's claim of bad faith is still
meritless. The failure of the officers to examine every laboratory component for fingerprints
before destroying the laboratory does not, by itself, demonstrate bad faith. Officer Michael
Renckert testified at trial that each laboratory component is examined as it is processed "to
see if there are fingerprints or any possibility of fingerprints being on it" (R. 326:163). He
explained that some items like glassware or metal transfer fingerprints "fairly easily," but
that it also "depends on the circumstances of the case and the environmental conditions" (R.
326:163). Thus, the decision to attempt to lift fingerprints from an object turns on an
officer's subjective evaluation of the object's propensity to transfer fingerprints in light of
the circumstances and environmental conditions in which the object was found. It follows
that an officer's decision not to process an object for fingerprints is not, without more,
evidence of a bad faith intent to conceal potentially exculpatory evidence from the defendant.
Rather, it represents a determination by the officer that an item is not likely to yield any
fingerprints.
Moreover, there is significant evidence that officers destroyed the laboratory pursuant
to standard law enforcement procedure to protect the public health and safety. "A police
department's compliance with departmental procedure should be regarded as an indication
that the disposal of evidence was not performed in bad faith." United States v. Heffington,
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952 F.2d 275, 281 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that police did not act in bad faith when they
destroyed a methamphetamine laboratory after processing it for evidence and pursuant to
department policy); see also United State v. Bohl. 25 F.3d 904, 912-13 (10th Cir. 1994)
(noting that government does not necessarily destroy evidence in bad faith if it follows
department policy and properly documents evidence). The State explaiined at the motion
hearing that officers destroyed the laboratory after they processed it to comply with DEA and
OSHA regulations (R. 325:38-39). The testimony at trial supported the State's explanation.
Agent Michael Renckert, who worked in the Metro Narcotics Task Force when defendant's
laboratory was seized, testified that it is standard procedure to destroy methamphetamine
laboratories once they are processed and sampled (R. 326:160). He explained the laboratory
is destroyed "[b]ecause of the hazardous nature of a meth lab" (R. 326:160).7
Defendant's allegation of bad faith is further negated by the nature of the evidence.
The evidentiary value of a fingerprint is not known to police until the fingerprint is lifted,
compared, and identified. When officers destroy evidence that might hold fingerprints, they
are destroying evidence that has equal chances of being inculpatory or exculpatory. The
officer's actions do not, therefore, demonstrate a bad faith intent to destroy evidence.
Thus, defendant's claim fails.

This testimony was not before the trial court when it decided defendant's motion.
However, this Court may affirm the trial court's ruling on any ground apparent in the record.
See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, f 20, 52 P.3d 1158.
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III.

DEFENDANT SUFFERED NO HARM FROM WITNESS
STATEMENTS THAT HE HAD SERVED PRISON TIME

Defendant asserts that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel because
his trial counsel failed to object to evidence that he had previously served prison time and
failed to request a cautionary instruction regarding such evidence. Aplt. Br. at 42.
Defendant's claim is meritless because, in light of the totality of the evidence of defendant's
guilt, there is not a reasonable probability that counsel's error affected the outcome of the
case.
"The Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy
judged with the benefit of hindsight." Yarborough v. Gentry, 124 S.Ct. 1, 6 (2003). To
establish that he did not receive the representation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment,
defendant must prove two elements. First, he must identify the specific acts or omissions he
claims fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687-88, 690 (1984); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994). Second
"[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694. However, "[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . .. that course should be followed." Id. at 697.
A. Proceedings Below
A few weeks after the State seized the laboratory from Felice's garage, officers
decided to question defendant (R 326:75). During the questioning, defendant made several
incriminating statements regarding his prior convictions for clandestine laboratory
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possession and his association with Felice and the laboratory in her garage (R. 120-21). The
State filed a motion in limine to admit defendant's statements under rule 404(b), Utah Rules
of Evidence (R. 119-33). The State proposed to use statements from defendant that (1) he
had been previously convicted of third degree clandestine laboratory possession; (2) he was
on parole for that conviction on the date the State had found the clandestine laboratory in
Felice's garage; and (3) the two milk jugs containing soaking ephedrine that were found in
Felice's garage with the laboratory belonged to defendant (R. 123). The State asserted that
the evidence was probative of defendant's intent to operated the clandestine laboratory found
in Felice's garage (R. 125). Defendant opposed the State's motion (R. 158-64).
The court held a hearing and listened to argument from both sides. It ultimately
granted the State's motion in part and denied the motion in part. (R. 192; 325:61).
Specifically, the court permitted the State to introduce defendant's confession that (1) he had
stored the ephedrine in Felice's garage because he had to be careful; (2) he had no intention
of operating a clandestine laboratory and only had the ephedrine "because he possessed it
before the last time he was caught;" (3) he kept the ephedrine because it could still be used to
manufacture methamphetamine; and (4) he denied owning any of the lab items and told the
owner to get them out of Felice's garage so she would not get in trouble (R. 121-22). The
court disallowed the State from introducing any evidence that defendant was on parole on the
date police seized the laboratory from Felice's garage or that defendant had previously been
convicted of clandestine laboratory possession (R. 120, 192).
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At trial, the State presented testimony from both of the officers who interviewed
defendant concerning defendant's admissions (R. 326:76, 131). Officer Scott Daniels
testified that defendant admitted he owned the jugs of soaking pseudoephedrine found with
the laboratory in Felice's garage (R. 326:77). He also testified that defendant said that "it
was important for him not to have those at his house, and that he was storing them from the
last time he had been caught" (R 326:77).
Later, the State's chief witness, Felice, stated during her testimony that defendant had
served prison time. She mentioned twice that defendant had been in prison, twice that he
was going back to prison around the time police seized the laboratory, and once that he was
in prison while the instant charges were pending (R. 327:183,186,189,216,261). Defense
counsel only objected to Felice's fourth reference to defendant's incarceration (R. 327:216).
The trial court overruled the objection (R. 327:216)
Defendant's incarceration was mentioned one more time during the testimony of a
defense witness, Nancy Vaughn (R. 327:304). Vaughn testified on direct that Felice and
defendant were romantically involved and that Felice had told her that three other people, not
defendant, were operating the laboratory in her garage (R. 327:293-98).

On cross-

examination, the State asked Vaughn how frequently she communicated with defendant (R.
327:304). Vaughn replied that she had received a birthday card and a short letter in the mail
(R. 327:304). The Stated asked her where the letter and card had come from, and Vaughn
replied, "From the prison" (R. 327:304). Defense counsel objected but did not state the basis
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for her objection (R. 327:304). The court sustained the objection without explanation (R.
327:304).
B. References to defendant's incarceration did not harm defendant in
light of the totality of the evidence before the jury.
"An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting
aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.'9 See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. To prove prejudice, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different."

Id. at 694. "A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id, "In making this
determination, an appellate court should consider the totality of the evidence, taking into
account such factors as whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an
isolated effect and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." State v. Templin^
805 P.2d 182, 187 (Utah 1990); see also State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, \ 20, 984 P.2d 376;
State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37, 39 (Utah 1996), abrogated on other grounds by State v.
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 9, 12 P.3d 92; State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 818 (Utah App.
1994).
In the instant case, the vague references to defendant's incarceration had little effect
on the entire evidentiary picture because the jury already knew that defendant had previously
been caught operating a methamphetamine laboratory (R. 326:77). Officer Daniels, testified
that defendant admitted he owned the jugs of soaking pseudoephedrine and that "it was
important for him not to have those at his house, and that he was storing them from the last
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time he had been caught" (R. 326:77) (emphasis added). Defense counsel did not object to
this statement and, in fact, would have had no basis to object because the court had already
ruled that the statement was admissible under rule 404(b) (R. 192). Defendant has not
complained on appeal that the statement was improperly admitted.
Where the jury properly learns that defendant was previously caught operating or
possessing a methamphetamine laboratory, it is not unfairly prejudicial that they also learn
that defendant went to prison for possessing the laboratory. The intent of rule 404(b), Utah
Rules of Evidence, is to prevent parties from introducing evidence of prior crimes solely to
prove the bad character of the accused. See State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 700 (Utah App.
1993). However, where evidence of a prior crime is properly admitted under rule 404(b),
evidence that defendant was punished for that prior crime is no more prejudicial than the
evidence of the prior crime itself.
Testimony that defendant had been incarcerated was also harmless because the jury's
guilty verdict was strongly supported by the record by independent evidence. The court
instructed the jury that it should find defendant guilty if it determined beyond reasonable
doubt that defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed a controlled substance precursor
with intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation (R. 237; 327:314). Defendant
confessed to police that he possessed the jugs of pseudoephedrine found with the laboratory
in Felice's garage (R. 326:77,131). Thus, the only question before the jury was whether he
possessed them with intent to operate a clandestine laboratory.
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There was substantial evidence of defendant's intent to use the pseudoephedrine to
manufacture methamphetamine.

The mere proximity of the jugs to an operating

methamphetamine laboratory indicates that owner of the jugs intended to use them to
manufacture methamphetamine. Defendant's own statement corroborated this inference.
Defendant told Officer Daniels that the ephedrine in the jugs had previously been used in a
laboratory and were leftover from the last time he was caught (R. 326:77-78, 131-32).
Defendant explained that the jugs still had value because he could extract some ephedrine
from them (R. 326:77).
Defendant's intent to operate a methamphetamine laboratory was also evidenced by
his acute familiarity with the laboratory. Although he denied it was his, defendant was able
to describe with precision the components and location of the laboratory (R. 326:77-80).
Defendant admitted he had handled the laboratory components and that his fingerprints
might be on the glassware (R. 326:78). Defendant described exactly how the vent system
was set up (R. 326:78). He also described the flat-bottomed flasks and correctly stated that
they were clean and empty (R. 326:79). Defendant's description of the laboratory's
configuration and contents was consistent with everything the police found when they seized
the laboratory (R. 326:79-80).
Finally, defendant's intent was established by Felice's testimony (R. 327:186-90).
Felice testified that she gave defendant a key to her garage and allowed him store things in it
(R. 327:185, 189). A few days later she discovered him cooking methamphetamine in the
garage (R. 327:186-90). Given the strength of the evidence of defendant's intent to operate
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a methamphetamine laboratory, the jury was certain to convict defendant. For the jury to
decide otherwise, it would have to find that, even though defendant could perfectly describe
the laboratory configuration and components, had handled the laboratory, and was storing
two jugs of soaking ephedrine with the laboratory, he had no intent to use the laboratory to
manufacture methamphetamine. It would also have to find that Felice had lied when she
testified that she saw defendant manufacturing methamphetamine in her garage.
The evidence defendant presented at trial was scant and unpersuasive. He called three
witnesses, none of whom had any direct knowledge of the laboratory or defendant's
involvement with the laboratory (R. 327:287-308). The first witness was a former Salt Lake
City Police Officer who had found Red Devil Lye and sodium hydroxide in Felice garbage
can during a warrant search of her home six months before the clandestine laboratory was
found (R. 327:289-90). The second witness was a friend of Felice's who testified that Felice
had said that three men, Gordon, Cody, and Brian, were operating a methamphetamine
laboratory in Felice's garage (R. 327:295-96). The last witness was defendant's father, who
testified that defendant had a very busy work schedule (R. 327:305-06). Defendant's own
admissions regarding his ownership of the pseudoephedrine, his previous involvement with
methamphetamine laboratories, and his acute knowledge of the instant laboratory were left
unrebutted.
The testimony about defendant's previous incarceration does not undermine
confidence in the trial outcome. Accordingly, even had the jury not known that defendant
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was previously incarcerated, there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have
acquitted defendant. Thus, defendant's claim fails.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm
defendant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted June 18, 2004.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
MATTHEW D. BATES
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum

Addendum A

77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending charge - Duties of custodial
officer - Continuance may be granted - Dismissal of charge for failure to bring to trial.
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison, jail or other
penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is pending against the prisoner in this state
any untried indictment or information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or
custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of the
pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date
of delivery of written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand described in
Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be forwarded by personal delivery or
certified mail, return receipt requested, to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk.
The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so
notified, provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commitment of the
demanding prisoner as shall be requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the prosecuting attorney
or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in open court, with the prisoner or his
counsel being present, may be granted any reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within such continuance
as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the action, the court shall
review the proceeding. If the court finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the
matter heard within the time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion
for continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice.
History: C. 1953, 77-29-1, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 15, § 2.
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MEMORANDUM
To:

All Justices, Judges, and Commissioners

From:

Myron K. March, Deputy State Court Administrator

Date:

April 17, 2001

Subject:

Olympic Update

This memorandum is an update to what is occurring with the judiciary and the upcoming
Winter Olympics.
The XlXth Olympic Winter Games are scheduled to begin on Friday, February 8, 2002,
and will end on Sunday, February 24, 2002. They will draw about 3,500 competitors from
approximately eighty nations who will compete in seventy different events. Approximately 1.6
million tickets will be sold for the games which will involve approximately 133,000 individuals
each day.
There will also be approximately 18,000 media representatives from around the world,
located in Utah during the games. The Olympic events will be staged at ten competition venues,
five mountain venues, and five city/indoor venues scattered around the seven county Olympic
Theater which includes Weber, Morgan, Davis, Salt Lake, Summit, Wasatch, and Utah Counties.
The mountain or snow venues will include Park City Mountain Resort, Deer Valley, Snow Basin,
Soldier Hollow, and Bear Hoilow/Utah Winter Sports Park. The indoor or ice venues will occur
at the Oquirrh Park/Kearns Oval Ice Ring, the E-Center, the Delta Center, the Seven Peaks
Hockey Arena, and the Ogden Ice Sheet. There will also be several non-competition venue sites
that will host Olympic activities, which include the Rice Eccles Stadium at the University of
Utah for the opening and closing ceremonies, the Salt Palace which will serve as the
International Broadcast Main Press Center, the Medals Plaza in Salt Lake City, Matin Street in
Park City, and the Olympic Village located at the University of Utah.
The recommendation is to create eight Olympic Courts throughout the Olympic Theater,
the areas where the Olympic events will be occuning. These courts would be located at the
The mission of the Utah judiciary is to provide the people an open, fair,
efficient and independent system for the advancement of justice under the law.

District Court locations in Morgan, Ogden, Farmington, the Matheson Courthouse in Salt Lake
City, West Valley City, Park City, Heber, and Provo.
Committees have or will be developed in each of the venue sites to determine the needs
and hours of operations for each of the proposed Olympic Courts. Those committees would
include a District Judge, a Juvenile Judge, a Justice Court Judge, the Court Executive from both
levels of court, the County Attorney/District Attorney, City Prosecutor, Legail Defender, Victim
Services representatives, and a representative from local law enforcement. Those committees will
review what events are occurring in their jurisdiction, the number of individuals that will be
watching those events, evaluating what non-competition events will occur in the jurisdiction, the
number of individuals anticipated to attend, and the hours that the events or functions are taking
place. With that information, they will develop a plan for the number of individuals required for
the Olympic Court and hours of operation.
The Vllth Paralympic Winter Games are scheduled to begin on March 7, 2002 and end on
Saturday, March 16, 2002. They will involve 1.100 competitors from 35 nations competing in 35
events in 4 sports. Many of the same locations used for Olympic competitions will be used to
stage the Paralympic competitions.
Since the Paralympics will not generate the same volume of spectators, it's anticipated
that the regular court operations will be able to handle the workload during this time period. The
special Olympic Courts will only be operational during the Winter Olympics from February 8th to
February 24th.
The following are the Olympic court locations and an overview of the events that will
occur within these jurisdictions:
1.

Morgan Court: Snow Basin Ski Area, located in Huntsville. Events mclude: Downhill,
Combined Downhill, and Super G World Cup. Capacity for watching events: 30,000
individuals. Times events are scheduled: 10:00 a.m to 4:00 p.m.

2.

Ogden Court: Ice Sheet, located in Ogden. Events include: Curling. Capacity for
watching events: 2,000 individuals. Times events are scheduled: 9:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.

3.

Farmington Court: Activity would include traffic from Salt Lake City and other areas to
and from events in Ogden and Huntsville.

4.

Park City Court:
Olympic Park, located in Park City. Events include: Bobsled, Luge, Skeleton, Ski
Jumping, and Nordic Combined. Capacity for watching events: 14,000 individuals. Times
events are scheduled: 11:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
Park City Mountain Resort, located in Park City. Events include: Giant Slalom,
Snowboard Giant Slalom, and Half-Pipe. Capacity for watching events: 17,000

individuals. Times events are scheduled: 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.
Deer Valley Resort, located in Park City. Events include: Slalom, Moguls, Free Style
Aerials. Capacity for watching events: 13,000 individuals. Times events are scheduled:
9:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.
5.

Matheson Court Salt Lake City:
Salt Lake Ice Center, located in Salt Lake City. Events include: Figure Skating, and Short
Trek Skating. Capacity for watching events: 17,082 individuals. Times events are
scheduled: 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., with a couple of nights scheduled to midnight.
Other activities include: the opening and closing ceremonies at Rice Eccles Stadium at
the University of Utah, the Medals Plaza in Salt Lake, the International Broadcast Main
Press Center at the Salt Palace, the Olympic Village located at the University of Utah,
and various other activities in Salt Lake.

6.

West Valley Court:
E-Center, located in West Valley. Events include: Men's Ice-Hockey, Women's IceHockey. Capacity for watching events: 10,508 individuals. Times events are scheduled:
10:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.
Olympic Oval Center, located in Keams. Events include: Speed Skating. Capacity for
watching events: 6,683 individuals. Times events are scheduled: 7:30 a.m. to 9:30 p.m.

7.

Heber Court: Soldier Hollow, located in Midway. Events include: Biathlon, Cross
Country/Nordic Combined. Capacity for watching events: 15,000 individuals. Times
events are scheduled: 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.

8.

Provo Court: Seven Peaks Ice Arena, located in Provo. Events include: Men's IceHockey and Women's Ice-Hockey. Capacity for watching events: 8,546 individuals.
Times events are scheduled: 10:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.

In each of these events, it is anticipated that Olympic staff will arrive four hours prior to
the scheduled event time and gates for the public will open two hours prior to the event time.
It is expected that existing staff and judges will be able to handle most of the coverage of
these Olympic Courts and their extended hours of operations. This could be accomplished by
flexing the working day and hours that employees work. Those schedules and times will be
worked out by the local committees and local courts. It is predicted that some of the Olympic
Courts will be operational from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., while others may be operational from
8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m., while still others may be operational from 8:00 a.m. to midnight. Again,
this is dependent on what events are scheduled in each jurisdiction, the number of spectators that
will be watching the events, and the non-competition events that are scheduled in some

jurisdictions.
The Utah Judicial Council has been involved in reviewing recommendations from the
Criminal Justice Subcommittee of the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command. The Judicial
Council supports the creation of Olympic Courts, as outlined in this memorandum. The Council
also supports the local Olympic Court Committees and delegates to them the responsibility of
developing a plan and schedule to handle the projected workload in their areas during the
Olympics.
The Judicial Council also indicated that all courts in Utah shall remain open during the
Olympics for conduct of the public's business, as required by law The Council also confirmed
the discretion vested in trial courts to schedule matters pending before those courts with
encouragement to avoid jury and criminal trials during the Olympics to the degree possible. The
Council also noted that some hearings and their time frames are mandated by law and those
hearings will need to be held as required.
The request from the Olympic Committee and the action of the Judicial Council is
intended to provide direction to the local communities as they prepare their plans to provide
coverage for court operations during the Olympics. Each committee should have the flexibility
within the guidelines established by the council, to review the activities that are planned within
their jurisdictions, the time the events or activities will occur, the anticipated number of attendees
and then to establish a schedule and plan to accommodate those needs.
Hopefully, this memorandum has provided updated information regarding the judiciary
and the upcoming Winter Olympics.

